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‘Asking for the moon’ - A ‘musing’ on Cornell’s Beyond Accommodation: 
Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction and the Law. 
 
Karin Van Marle* 
 
The first writing of Drucilla Cornell that I ever read - and have reread many times thereafter - was 
her 1990 Cornell Law Review publication titled ‘The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and The 
Feminine.’ Beyond Accommodation, published in 1991, can either be regarded as an elaboration of 
the ideas and thoughts raised in the 1990 article, or the latter could be regarded as a shortened 
version of the book. Be that as it may, Cornell, since the late eighties/early nineties, has been putting 
forward a multi-layered and complex feminist philosophy that no one can nor should attempt to 
summarise and from which no one should even attempt to take out the main themes or highlights. I 
can merely mention three notions put forward by Cornell in the book that not only influenced my 
engagement with feminist theory but also changed my understanding of law in a deep and profound 
manner. Firstly, the affirmation of sexual difference without relying on any given understanding or 
description of ‘woman’; secondly, the insistence on the deconstructability of the law; and thirdly, her 
explicit focus on the ‘heart.’ These three notions all support what for me continues to be Cornell’s 
greatest contribution - her consistent and infallible use of fable, myth, and the imagination that 
could push feminists, as she has it, following Derrida,  to even ‘ask[] for the moon’ (Cornell 1991: 
205).  
 
‘The story of sexual difference is continually affirmed’ (2) 
Cornell’s affirmation of sexual difference without reverting to any given description of what ‘woman’ 
is or supposed to be remains one of the most important contributions to feminist thought. The well 
known and trite debates on sameness/difference, or whether we should focus on difference as an 
issue of dominance, relationality or care were left behind by Cornell’s ‘mamafesta.’ Joining 
postcolonial and critical race feminists, Cornell underscores the importance of race, class and 
ethnicity for women’s freedom and justice.  But her careful play with these aspects prevented any 
form of rigid identity politics. Similarly important is that she manages to take the material suffering 
of women as an extremely serious matter while not limiting women to any given presentation.  As 
Cornell states:  
Writing the mamafesta, as I rewrote it here, is a fable for the elucidation of Her-story such 
that feminine “reality” can be written. In the fable as I have rewritten it, the opposition 
between the literal and the textual is undermined. Undermined, but not obliterated. The 
material suffering of women is not being denied in the name of a process of writing that 
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continually transforms the representation of the feminine as if the rewriting itself could put 
an end to patriarchy. Instead, the fable emphasizes the deconstruction of a reality that 
stands in as the unshakable, literal truth, so that the more that has yet to be written from 
the side of the feminine is not shut out as non-existent. No woman can claim that hers is the 
ultimate reality excluding all others, based on a concept of gender identity or on the 
uncovering of the essence of Woman. Thus, the writing of the mamafesta does not attempt 
to resolve the riddle of femininity once and for all, by locating women’s specificity in a pre-
given nature of sexual difference. (2) 
 
‘Deconstruction points us beyond legal reform to justice’ (111) 
Cornell’s refusal to accept any given description of what woman is or what women’s subordination 
entails has significant implications for law and legal reform. 
The “subject” is never just the hostage of its surroundings, because these surroundings 
cannot be consolidated into an unshakable reality that defines us and by so doing 
necessarily limits possibility to the evolution of what already “is.” (107)  
The reliance on differance as continuously subverting the claim that ‘this is all there is’ and disclosing 
the ‘trace of Otherness’ that always remains, exposes the limits of any attempt of legal reform to 
legitimately respond to women’s subordination (108-109). Following Lyotard, Cornell explains how 
any given description of the real (‘the tyranny of the real’ (109)) will exclude some from the system 
and deny some voices to be heard.  Feminists in their quest for justice must heed this. Cornell 
follows Lyotard, who instead of defining justice, defines injustice, because any attempt to describe 
justice will amount to ‘confining resistance within itself’ (110). According to Cornell, deconstruction 
can have an important bearing on feminist jurisprudence because it illustrates how, by 
reinterpretation, the law could be challenged and transformed. However, these possible challenges 
and transformations should not be confused with justice. 
To be just to justice, we must not conflate justice with any given context, even the context 
that ended a particular injustice for women and the silence surrounding a claim unspeakable 
within a particular tradition. (112)   
 
‘Hearts starve as well as bodies’ (xv) 
From her very first writings Cornell has been firm about the notion that feminism should be about 
‘changing woman’s place in the world’ (xv). ‘But’ as she rightly asks ‘what does changing the world 
entail?’ (xv). She notes that it most definitely entails change in women’s material reality, about how 
goods and resources are redistributed. Feminism, in particular second wave feminists, have focused 
on the importance of women’s bodies. However, Cornell underscores that ‘hearts starve as well as 
bodies’ (xv). In an era in which women’s rights, socio-legal and specifically empirical approaches are 
in full force, women are mainstreamed through international, regional and local treaties and 
conventions,  and are counted and measured, Cornell’s claim for a feminism inspired by idealism - 
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what she names ethical feminism - is of great importance. Psychoanalytic theory is also crucial for 
ethical feminism: ‘By centering attention on the form of the free person, we are confronted with 
what psychoanalytic theory has called psychic laws, the law of how human beings are enculturated’ 
(xvi). However, Cornell’s engagement with Lacan is not straightforward. Although she follows his 
insights to a certain extent she departs from his claim that the feminine is ultimately 
unrepresentable. The representation of woman can take many forms, and of course we should be 
cautious not to attempt to capture or lock ‘woman’ to any given description. However, through 
myth, fable and allegory we could continue to seek to affirm feminine sexual difference without 
reverting to old stereotypes: 
The affirmation of the feminine may be impossible as other than the reversion to the old 
stereotypes. Undecidability cannot be wiped out in an appeal to knowledge if there is no 
ontological given to the feminine we can appeal to as our truth. … But the possibility that we 
might be approaching a new choreography of sexual difference with every new step we take 
can also not be wiped out. (205)     
I have been relying on Cornell since the beginning of my academic career.  In 1994 I began research 
for my LLM dissertation on the possibility of legal transformation with specific reference to how 
pornography was treated in a then very ‘new’ South Africa. Cornell’s ethical feminism, the nuanced 
engagement with women’s sexual difference and the problems of representation steered me to 
formulating an approach to the regulation of pornography in a society with many newly founded 
freedoms. In my LLD thesis I again drew on Cornell in order to argue for an ethical interpretation of 
equality as a response to the developing equality jurisprudence that was heavily based on Canadian 
substantive equality approaches. These early research projects provided me with what Njabulo 
Ndebele (2003: 82) calls ‘an angle of approach’ for future endeavours focused on notions of 
transformation, critique and the becoming of a post-apartheid jurisprudence.  For me the greatest 
contribution of Cornell as ethical feminist is that, in her problematisation of traditional boundaries, 
she discloses alternative approaches for others to follow in feminism, law and life. Being a feminist 
researcher in post-apartheid South Africa, Cornell’s work has been and will remain inspirational for a 
long time to come. ‘Such a new choreography may be asking for the moon, but through asking for 
the moon, we speak and write’ (205).      
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